This study analyzes the legal uncertainties and dispute structures of Standard Essential Patent licensing within the intersection of patent and competition law. It examines the legal nature of FRAND commitments as contractual obligations and third-party beneficiary structures, while synthesizing core doctrines on injunctions, determination royalties, and good faith negotiation. This study derives normative implications from market failures, such as patent hold-up, licensee hold-out, and royalty stacking. By comparing the United Kingdom’s global rate setting, China’s Anti-Suit Injunctions, and South Korea’s competition law-centered enforcement, this study identifies a shift from private disputes to jurisdictional competition. This shift escalates transaction costs and results in duplicative litigation. Therefore, this study proposes(1) international judicial cooperation through procedural agreements; (2) the strategic use of WIPO ADR as an alternative to prolonged litigation; and (3) policy support for small and medium-sized enterprises, including greater transparency, in essentiality verification. Finally, to enhance legal stability and international predictability, it suggests a phased legislative roadmap for addressing immediate legal gaps before integration into a standalone law. This approach seeks a structural balance between patent protection and fair competition, extending beyond a binary opposition between the two to foster a sustainable industrial ecosystem.